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VASHINGTON CASE LAW-1955
technicalities. He admits in his opinion that his interpretation is subject
to argument, and with this statement this writer must agree, for he finds
in the effect complained of, viz., mental cruelty, grounds for divorce,
although the statutory language of RCW 26.08.020 (5) calls for "cruel
treatment of either party by the other . . ." and the complaint in this
case does not allege that the complained of mental cruelty was inflicted
by the conduct of the defendant, but as a result of "incompatibility of
temperment [sic] ."
If, as the majority holds, only mental cruelty caused by the conduct
of the defendant provides grounds for divorce, then the majority's
second reason for affirmance and the basis of Judge Finley's concurring
opinion marks a departure from the former holdings of the court in
Fix v. Fix1" and Donaldson v. Donaldson" where the court has said
that they are limited, in granting divorces, to the enumerated grounds
of the statutes.
It is clear from the decision of this case, that the court looks with
disfavor upon RCW 4.32.190 and the applicable section of Rule on
Appeal 43, 34 A Wn.2d 47, and in cases of default judgment will search
beyond the plain wording of the complaint in ruling upon objections to
the failure of the complaint to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause
of action. '
RoGER L. WILL Ams
PROBATE
Probate-Removal of Guardian-Vacation of an Order Authorizing Settlement
of Claims. In re Whitish, 147 Wash. Dec. 585, 289 P.2d 340 (1955), was an action
by minors to remove their putative guardian and to set aside an order authorizing her
to execute releases and to settle claims. The guardian ad litem contended that the
putative guardian was not qualified to receive letters of guardianship. The putative
guardian's petition had recited that the minors were the owners of a claim totaling
$5,500 but that, after settlement of creditors' claims, the minors' estate would not
10 33 Wn.2d 229, 204 P.2d 1066 (1949).
1138 Wn2d 748, 231 P.2d 607 (1951).
12 The decision in this case was of unusual importance to the defendant in that its
outcome held a direct bearing on a criminal prosecution for murder. The superior court
of Asotin County entered the default judgment of divorce against the defendant on May
18, 1954. On June 8, 1954, the defendant was charged with the crime of first degree
murder in the same county. Eight days later, on June 16, 1954, the defendant gave notice
of appeal from the judgment of divorce. As was pointed out by the court in its second
paragraph of its opinion, neither the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney of Asotin
county, who appeared in the divorce appeal as amicus curiae, were as interested in the
"maintenance or the sanctity of the marriage relationship" as they were in the ability
of the plaintiff in the divorce action to appear as a witness against the defendant in
the murder trial.
Because of this highly important collateral issue, it would seem to furnish an
additional reason for the court to abide by the legislative dictates as manifested in both
RCW 26.08.020 and RCW 4.32.190.
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exceed $500. The probate court had not required the posting of a bond before issuing
letters of guardianship. Held: RCW 11.88.100 provides that when the estate of a
minor exceeds $500 posting of a bond is a condition precedent to issuing letters of
guardianship. "It is the gross value of the minor's estate, not claimed net value, which
determines whether a guardian's bond is necessary." The court below had no jurisdic-
tion to enter an order directing the putative guardian to settle the minors' claims and
to execute a valid release.
Probate-Filing of Creditor's Claims. In Shumate v. Ashley, 46 Wn2d 156, 278 P.2d
787 (1955), P filed a conformed copy of a creditor's claim with the executor of the
decedent's estate. The executor rejected it contending that the claim was not in
accordance with RCW 11.40.010-.030. Held: that the original claim, with its
disposition noted thereon, must be filed and become a part of the court record; that,
while the Washington State Bar Association's probate form No. 28 provides for the
use of two duplicate originals, it is not controlling, being drawn only in an excess
of caution. Thus, the executor must be satisfied with a conformed copy served by
regular mail.
REAL PROPERTY
Power of Revocation. In Grove v. Payne' a power of revocation
was found to have been reserved in the grantor of an interest in real
property. A deed conveying a fee simple was conditioned with the
words "... subject to [grantor's] will made prior to this date, with
such codicils as may be added.... The grantee had leased a life
estate to the grantor subsequent to the grant. The lessor retained a
right of entry conditioned upon, inter alia, an attempt to assign the
leasehold interest without permission. The grantor-lessee thereafter
attempted to assign the leasehold interest by quitclaim deed to a third
party. This attempted assignment caused the grantee-lessor to seek an
ejectment of the defendant and a quieting of title.' In sustaining the
plaintiff's claim to a right of entry the court, after holding that the
quitclaim deed failed to pass the leasehold interest, also held that it
was not valid as a conveyance of the grantor's power of revocation by
testamentary disposition. There was no elaboration to why the pro-
vision in the deed constituted a power of revocation by testamentary
disposition. The court's silence raises a question concerning the dis-
tinguishing elements delineating a power of revocation from a power
of appointment. The two concepts bear a close relationship but the
authorities prefer to distinguish them.4
1 147 Wash. Dec. 411, 288 P.2d 242 (1955).
2 Id. at 412, 288 P.2d at 243.
3 The plaintiff relied on RCW 7.28.010.
4 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 318, comment i (1940) ; Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Gardner, 264 Mass. 68, 161 N.E. 801 (1928).
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